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McCauley: The Nature of a Reservoir Right

COMMENT
THE NATURE OF A RESERVOIR RIGHT
The appropriation doctrine of water law is based on the
economic principle of maximization of use of the natural
resource for the maximum public benefit. Under this doctrine, the reservoir serves as an integral part in the human
effort to distribute water to use as efficiently as possible.
The appeal of a reservoir lies in its function-storage of
water from which a constant, reliable supply can be made
available to the beneficial user, relieving that user of the
need to rely on the natural stream for a direct, and more
precarious supply. The user controls his source to meet his
demands, rather than adapting his schedule to the character
of the source.
Modern societal demands for a controlled constant supply
are great. Modern industry utilizes production techniques
which require a stable supply of resources used in production.
Temporary delays caused by the failure of an essential water
supply result in higher production costs and higher prices.
The continued recurrence of such delays would undermine
the attractiveness of the area as an industrial site, inhibiting
the influx of industry into the area while encouraging local
industry to search elsewhere for a more suitable location.
Agricultural use of the reservoir can provide the rancher
or farmer with a buffer against the late summer drought, or
a source of storage of extra water for insurance against the
possibility of a dry year. The reservoir eliminates waste of
water by preventing the flow of excess or unused water
during the early part of the irrigation season, storing this
excess until later in the season, or from year to year until
it is needed.
The growing concentration of masses in the cities most
emphatically underscores the importance of reservoirs. The
number of people in one locale prohibits individual appropriations by direct flow. The necessity is obvious. Flood
control, soil conservancy, recreation, and fire control are a
few of the other functions served by reservoirs. Though
these functions meet basic needs for our society, and the
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reservoir is basic to our society, there is no compilation of
the bits and pieces of information available in statute and
case law which circumscribe the exact nature of a reservoir
right. The appropriation states have made essential provisions in their statutes pertinent to the creation and maintenance of a reservoir right. Case law from these different states
has molded the right into a more definite shape. The nature
remains to be probed.
THE RIGHT TO STORE WATER

The right to store water, under appropriation law, is the
right to appropriate, that is, divert and collect water for
later application to a beneficial use.' In most of the appropriation states, the law requires a person desiring to appropriate water to file a formal application for a permit before
his water right will be given any legal significance.2
Colorado requires no permit to establish an appropriation. Montana requires no permit, but requires the posting
of public notice of the appropriation at the site of the diversion within ten days after diverting and appropriating water
from a non-adjudicated stream.' In Montana, special procedure is required to obtain appropriations from an adjudicated stream.4 But these procedures for permits or for
posting of notice are fundamental to all water rights, direct
or storage. The storage right is a distinct right as to several
features.
Generally, the states require, for the purpose of public
safety, that the builder of a reservoir file with the state water
official detailed plans and maps of the reservoir to be built,
if the reservoir is to be greater than a specified minimum
size allowed for stock watering ponds.' The water official
1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(B) (1953); ORE. REv. STAT. § 537.130
(1953); Wyo. STAT. § 41-28 (1957).
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-142 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-202 (1947);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-420 (Supp. 1961); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5956-16 (Supp.
1966) ; NR. REV. STAT. § 46-233 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.325 (1960) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-02 (Supp.
1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 21 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 537.130 (1953); S.D. CODE § 61.0110 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
art. 7492 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1953); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.03.250 (1962); Wyo. STAT. § 41-26 (1957).
3. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-810 (1947).
4. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-831 (1947).
5. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-142 (1953); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-4-1
(1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1707 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5956-17
(Supp. 1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-237 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533350

2.
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must approve these plans before construction may begin." A
few states give the state water official the power to appoint
an assistant who will supervise the construction, if, in the
eyes of the state water official, such supervision is necessary
in the interest of public safety.7
Montana seems to be the singular exception to these practices. In Montana, the procedure is reversed. No maps or
plans must be filed for state approval. No provision is made
for supervision of the construction of any reservoir. A person
may build a reservoir. Water may be stored within the
reservoir. The state is required to act only in the event that
a complaint impuning the safety of the facilities is filed
with the state water commissioner.8 Then the water commissioner must inspect the facilities. If, at that time, the
facilities are found to be unsafe, the commissioner may require
the reservoir owner to reduce the quantity of water contained
within the reservoir to that amount which the reservoir can
safely contain. If the reservoir owner refuses to comply with
the order, or fails to comply, the commissioner may estimate
the costs of the works, empty the reservoir, take bids on the
repair work, authorize the repairs, and bill the reservoir
owner for the work done. The bill may then be collected as
any other tax debt.
This Montana procedure has its advantages in that it
minimizes red tape and governmental intrusion into the
affairs of the individual citizen. The major disadvantage
would seem to be that there is too great a chance for economic
waste. Without a doubt, inspection of and supervision of the
construction of every reservoir built costs a great deal more
than no inspection or supervision of construction until a
complaint is filed. However, the value of insurance is speculative. The overall cost to society in the long run may be
greater if no inspection is made to prevent the construction
of a public hazard until such time as a complaint is filed,
(1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-03
(Supp. 1965) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 21 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT.

§ 537.140 (1953); S.D. CODE § 61.0110 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
art. 7494 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-16 (1953);
CODE ANN. § 90.03.260 (1962) ; WYO. STAT. § 41-207 (1957).

6. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-5 (1963);
(1947); NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.370 (1960).
7. WYO. STAT. § 41-30 (1957).
8. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-702 (1947).

WASH. REv.

IDAHO CODE ANN.
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if the complaint is timely. The waste is evident even in the
event that this least advantageous possibility occurs. The
reservoir owner must pay additional sums to correct an error
in construction which could have been avoided, had the state
required plans to be approved initially. A second consideration may be of more importance. The most likely person to
file a complaint will be the neighboring landowner whose
land, property, and perhaps, life may be threatened by a
poorly constructed reservoir wall. Yet, the neighboring landowner may be reluctant to complain of an unsafe condition,
if he knows it exists, or he may in fact have contributed to
the existence of such circumstances, as he is likely to be a
shareholder in the reservoir company with an interest in
economizing at the expense of safety. If such a situation
should exist, the attendant threat to the safety of riparian
property downstream will not be uncovered until such time
as the reservoir ruptures, resulting in even greater economic
waste.
A problem which is unique to securing a reservoir right
is the problem of establishing a date of priority as early as
possible after the formation of the necessary intent to secure
the appropriation from a particular source. States requiring
an application to be filed for a permit to appropriate have
generally stated that the appropriation is complete at the
time of the application of the water to a beneficial use.9 To
prevent an appropriator from losing his priority to a later
appropriator who is able to complete his appropriation before
the earlier appropriator can complete his diversion and application, the rule of relation back has been created and applied.
Most states hold that once a diversion is complete, and the
water has been beneficially applied, the appropriation is
complete, and the date of priority of the appropriation will
relate back to the date of making formal application for a
permit."0
9.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-217 (1947).

10. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936); City & County of Denver v.
Northern Colo. Water Cons. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954);
Washington State Sugar Co. v. Goodrich, 27 Idaho 26, 147 P. 1073 (1915);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 5956-17(a) (Supp. 1966); NEB. RED. STAT. § 46-205
(1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-04
(Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 23 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 537.250(3) (1953); S.D. CODE § 61.0109 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 7496 (Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.340 (1962);
Wyo. STAT. § 41-35 (1957); Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957,
961 (1943).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/6

4

McCauley: The Nature of a Reservoir Right

1968

1968
COMMENT

In the case of an appropriator who wishes to construct
a large reservoir, the filing of an application must include
plans, blueprints, and maps which may require several months,
perhaps years, to prepare. The appropriator may complete
his plans and file his application only to find that another
person has just filed an application for part or all of that
water he had intended to appropriate, the other person having
learned of his intent to so appropriate for storage before
forming his own intent to appropriate. In this situation,
unless there are exceptional circumstances, it is possible that
he who first formed the intent to appropriate, and who proceeded with due diligence to file an application, loses the
earlier priority to the person who forms the later intent to
use the same water and puts the water to direct use where
detailed plans and lengthy preparation for application are
unnecessary.
Perhaps in most states the problem is by-passed through
administrative action and discretion. But a more certain, and
much more predictable situation does exist in two states which
have provided by statute that the party wishing to build a
reservoir of a certain capacity or larger, supplied by a particular source, can file a preliminary notice of intent to
appropriate, and file a later formal application with full
plans. In Texas, the notice of intent is the "Presentation.""
In New Mexico, it is the Notice of Intent." In these states,
priority relates back to the date of filing of the notice of
intent.
A case which illustrates the problem of relation back in
3
this situation is the 1943 Utah case of Tanner v. Bacon."
Tanner owned a power plant near Provo and wished to
appropriate 100 c.f.s. of water to run through his plant. At
the same time, and for two years previously, the state of Utah,
the City of Provo, the Provo Water Users Association, and
the federal government were drawing up plans and expending
$25,000 on surveys and investigations for using the same
water Tanner had applied for. The city had planned a reclamation project reservoir for an additional municipal supply
and for a supply of water beyond the city's needs, to be made
11. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 7496 (Supp. 1965).
12. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1 (1953).
18. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
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available to surrounding farmers for irrigation. Due to the
complexity of the project, the city had been unable to complete and file an application until after Tanner had filed
his. The State Engineer initially denied Tanner his permit
on the grounds that the Governor of Utah had already reserved the water for another purpose. The District Court overruled the State Engineer, noting that Tanner had filed his
application first, and that his date of priority should be as
of the date of that filing. Upon issuance of the permit to
Tanner, the other interested parties filed protest, and another
hearing was held. As a result of this hearing, the State Engineer recalled Tanner's permit, again denying Tanner his
earlier priority on the basis of two state statutes permitting
the State Engineer to deny issuance of a permit upon application on the grounds of public welfare, and giving a preference to municipal use and agricultural use over industrial
use. On these particular statutes as they applied to this
particular situation, the District Court upheld the decision
of the State Engineer, upon Tanner's appeal, on the grounds
that to allow Tanner the earlier priority would deprive the
city of water, and thus be detrimental to public welfare.
Tanner v. Bacon is hardly reliable precedent for a large
irrigation company seeking to assert its rights against a
smaller irrigator or group of irrigators. It may be most
difficult for the larger concern to prove that its one large
reservoir is of greater interest to "public welfare" than
several direct flow ditches. If in the instant case, Tanner
had been asserting his right against another power plant who
intended to impound its water and produce power, rather
than to rely on the direct flow supply, would the court have
denied Tanner his earlier priority date ? This case demonstrates the desirability of statutes such as Texas and New
Mexico employ, and the corresponding predictability.
THE APPLICATION OF STORED WATER

Once the water right has been acquired, and the water
has been diverted and stored, the reservoir owner becomes
concerned with the problem of application of the water to
beneficial use. The storage of water is not of itself, a
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/6
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beneficial use. 4 The storage of water in and of itself is not
to be confused with carry-over storage, which is the storage
of excess for a planned purpose. The storage of a carry-over
supply may raise the question of storage for storage sake,
but courts have consistently held that carry-over has its
purposes, and is therefore a beneficial use."6 In Van Tassell
Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 6 the court
held that the fact that the city failed to immediately apply
the water stored to beneficial use in no way invalidated the
appropriation. The court felt that the several purposes which
the water served while stored, such as water as insurance
against the out-break of fire, more than adequately met the
requirements of the beneficial use rule. In Colorado, where
over-appropriation was common, and the available water
supply is insufficient to meet all the demands placed upon
it, the court is perhaps more stringent in its application of
the beneficial use rule, as typified by Highland & Ditch Co.
v. Union Res. Co.:"
It is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the
evidence further than to state possibly, excepting
a portion of the [water] awarded, it appears that
appellee has never applied the water stored in his
reservoir to the irrigation of land. Diversion and
storage are not sufficient to constitute an appropriation. In addition, the water so diverted and
stored must be beneficially applied; that is, in this
instance, it must have been applied to lands for
the purpose of irrigation. 8
While the storage of excess, or carry-over, water may not be
directly involved in the question of application of an appropriation to beneficial use, it is a consideration in the question
of whether storage is, in and of itself, a beneficial use. The
Colorado rule is probably the general rule, as there is not
likely to be an allowance of excess in a time of scarcity, when
the aid of the rules of law is sought in the assertion of one
right over another.
14. In re Greybull Valley Irr. Dist., 52 Wyo. 479, 76 P.2d 339 (1938). Highland
Ditch Co. v. Union Res. Co., 53 Colo. 483, 127 P. 1025 (1912).
15. Holt v. City of Cheyenne, 22 Wyo. 212, 137 P. 876, 880 (1913) ; Edwards v.
City of Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677, 690 (1911).
16. 49 Wyo. 333, 54 P.2d 906 (1936).
17. 53 Colo. 483, 127 P. 1025 (1912).
18. Id., 127 P. at 1025.
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If the storage of water is not the final goal of the storage
right, the purpose for which the water was stored becomes
the next consideration. The purpose may be a municipal, an
industrial, or an agricultural use. In all the states applying
appropriation law, the reservoir owner may sell or lease the
water or part thereof to others who will convey the water
from the reservoir to the place of application to use by means
of ditch, pipeline, or bed of a natural stream. 9 The water
so distributed may become inseverably attached to the land
by deed,2" or may become an appurtenance transferable from
plot to plot upon the approval of the water official, who
must determine that such a transfer will not be injurious to
other rights, and that the application is a beneficial use.2"
The use to which the water is being changed does not necessarily have to be the same use to which it was put before.2 2
A few states provide by statute for secondary permit for
appropriations from reservoirs. In Arizona,2" Nevada, 4
Nebraska," Oregon,2" and Washington 27 the state mandatorily
requires any person who wishes to appropriate water impounded in a reservoir for application to a beneficial use
to apply for a secondary permit before such a diversion and
application is made. The secondary permit, then, serves the
same purpose for appropriations from reservoirs as the permit
serves for appropriation for a direct flow right.
Originally, the Wyoming statute providing for secondary
permits was considered to be mandatory, that is a secondary
permit was required to make an appropriation from a reservoir. The statute read: "Any party desiring to appropriate
19. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-912 (1947);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-391 (Supp. 1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.525 (1960);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-24 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-17 (Supp.
1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 21 (Supp. 1967), tit. 82, § 34 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 541.010(1) (1953); S.D. CODE § 61.0121 (Supp. 1960);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 7553 (Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.16.100 (1962) - WYO. STAT. § 41-44 (1957); see also, TRELEASE, WATER
LAW 263 n.2 (1967).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-24 (1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 553.445 (1960); WYO.
STAT. § 41-44 (1957).
21. ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222 (1947);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 540.510 (1953).
22. Petition of Pacific Power & Light Co., State Board of Control, Order No.
13, P. 401, Nov. 21, 1956; Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case
Studies in the Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 48
(1966).
23.

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151 (1953).

24.
25.
26.
27.

NEV. REV. STAT. §
NEB. REV. STAT. §
ORE. REV. STAT. §
WASH. REV. CODE

533.440 (1960).
46-242 (1960).
537.300(2) (1953).
ANN. § 90.03.370 (1962).
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However, in 1939, the
such stored water shall apply ....
state legislature amended the statute to read "may apply.""
The Wyoming Supreme Court later ruled that the pre-1939
statute creating the secondary permit was permissive, that
the word shall should be read may." Thus, in Wyoming, while
a party wishing to appropriate water impounded in a reservoir may be urged to secure a secondary permit for the
purpose of record and of notice, he is not required to do
so in order to acquire a legally sufficient claim to such water
as he does appropriate from a reservoir.8

Once such a permit is acquired, where required, or once
the water has been diverted to the place of use, and beneficially applied where no secondary permit is necessary, the
right becomes an appurtenance to the land, and will pass
with the title of the property to which it has been beneficially applied, unless severed from the land by deed and
transferred to another appropriator for use on other land.
In thirteen of the appropriation states, all water rights are
thus transferable." In Nebraska, 8 Oklahoma, 4 and South
Dakota, 5 direct flow rights are inseverably appurtenant to
the land for which the water was appropriated for application to beneficial use, unless the change in point of diversion,
place of use, or purpose is desirable for the benefit of public
welfare as determined by the state water agency. In Nevada,
both direct flow and reservoir rights are so restricted.86 In
Wyoming, the statute reads that no direct flow from a natural
unstored source shall be severed and transferred from the
land for which the water was appropriated. 7 There are
28. Wyo. REv. STAT. § 122-1501 (1931) [Emphasis supplied].
29. Ch. 59, § 1, [1939] Wyo. Sess. Laws 64, now incorporated in Wyo. STAT.
§ 41-27 (1957).
30. Condict v. Ryan, 79 Wyo. 231, 335 P.2d 792 (1959).
31. Trelease & Lee, Priorities and Progress--Case Studies in the Transfer of
Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 47 (1966).

32. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-172 (1958); CAL. WATER CODE §

1700-1706;

(Supp. 1959); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-22 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 42-222 (1948); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708(b) (Supp. 1961); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 89-803 (1947) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-23 (1953) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-14-15 (Supp. 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 540.510 (1953); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (1953);

WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 90.03.380

(1962);

Clark v. Briscoe Irr. Co., 200 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Miocene
Ditch Co. v. Campton Mining & Trading Co., 3 Alaska 572 (1908); see also,
Trelease & Lee, supra note 31, at 22.
33.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-122 (1960).

34.
35.
36.
37.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82 (1951).
S.D. CODE § 61.0128 (Supp. 1960).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.040 (1960).
Wyo. STAT. § 41-2 (1957).
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exceptions to this rule in other sections of the Wyoming
Water Act, in effect leaving appropriations after 1909 for
the direct flow for irrigation purposes the sole right inseverably attached to the land.3" (The Wyoming "no change"
statute was passed in 1909, and it has been held that the
statute in no way restricts pre-1909 rights.) 9
This restriction of no-change on the direct flow rights
in the four states, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and
Wyoming, should cause the direct flow appropriator saddled
with such an inflexible right to take note that a reservoir
right is freely transferable. There is sufficient precedent
established that a direct flow right may be exchanged for a
reservoir right.4" Thus, the direct flow appropriator may
achieve transferability by exchanging with a reservoir company his direct flow right for a storage right, if such a transfer will not be injurious to other appropriators. If the injury
to another is likely, absolute denial of transfer, today, would
be unlikely, as the amount of water tonsumed by the use prior
and the right should be transto transfer can be computed,
41
ferable to that extent.
When the water user is ready to take delivery of his
water from the reservoir, he is faced with the immediate
problem of transportation of the water to his land. The
user will be most fortunate if he can channel the water from
the reservoir directly upon his land. It is most probable,
however, that the user's land will not be directly adjacent
to the reservoir. The user may find it possible to use the bed
of a natural stream as a course for transporting his water
to his land. Such action is allowed in the various states, and
the process is closely regulated by the state, whose water
official must be notified in advance, before the reservoir
water is released and commingled with the water of the
natural stream, as the official must close all diversion works'
headgates between the point of release and the rightful user's
38. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3 (1957).
39. Letter from George F. Guy, Attorney General, State of Wyoming, to State
Board of Control, May 12, 1955, as referred to in Trelease & Lee, supra note
31, at 36.
40. Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-5 to -8 (1957); Petition of Wheatland Irr. Dist., State
Board of Control, Order No. 16, pp. 1-26, Nov. 19, 1964, cited by Trelease
& Lee, supra note 31, at 45.
41. Trelease & Lee, supra note 31, at 46.
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ditch, ensuring that the user receives all of his due appropriation.2
Most states provide by statute that an appropriator who
must cross the land of another in order to transport the
water by canal to his land has a right to a right of way across
the intervening lands.4 He may enforce that right by condemning that land needed under the power of eminent domain,
and constructing canals over that land upon payment of just
compensation for the land taken.4
OWNERSHIP QUESTIONS

Ownership of the physical facilities of the reservoir is
an important consideration. It is generally held that an
appropriator of water stored in a reservoir owns only a right
to the use of a specified amount of water, unless his deed to
the right gives him an interest in the reservoir. In either
instance, the appropriator of stored water will be assessed
an annual fee proportionate to his equity interest in the
water as his equitable burden of cost and maintenance of
the reservoir.4 '
In Wyoming, section 41-34 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes
provides that the sale of any portion of the capacity of any
reservoir shall carry with it an interest in the physical plant
in proportion to the user's interest in that stored water. Yet,
in Anderson v. Wyoning Devel. Co.," the plaintiffs were
attempting to obtain a decree from the court enjoining the
defendants from further sale of land which would subdivide
the plaintiffs' already inadequate share of the company's
reservoir. The claim for relief was based partially on the
assertion that in selling the plaintiffs' land with a specified
water right attached, the defendants had sold the plaintiffs
an interest in the facilities of the reservoir; and when the
quantity of land sold equaled that amount of land which
could be adequately irrigated from the defendants' reservoir,
the company had divested itself of all interest in the reservoir.
42. ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-174 (1953); COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-5-2 (1963);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.445 (1960); WYO. STAT. § 41-29 (1957).
43. See TRELEASE, WATER LAW 63 n.2 (1967).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 773-1-6 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1106 (1947);
MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 15(a) (1889); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7583 (Supp.
1965).
45. For a more detailed discussion, see TRELEASE, WATER LAW 257-59 (1967).
46. Anderson v. Wyoming Devel. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 340 (1944).
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The court refused to acknowledge the fact that the plaintiffs
had received anything other than the interest for which they
had contracted, which was no interest at all in the reservoir
facilities. The court made no mention of 1931 Wyoming Revised Statutes, section 122-1601 (presently, section 41-34,
supra). However, the court mentioned language similar to
that used in section 122-1601 in another statute section 91-707
[which statute was not carried forward to the 1957 compilation]; and the court noted that the language had been carried
forward from the 1895 adoption by the state of Wyoming of
the Carey Land Act. The court then denied application of
that provision to the situation under consideration, on the
grounds that the Wyoming Development Co. was not a Carey
Land Act corporation. Thus, the issue presented by section
41-34 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes has never been resolved.
The apparent conclusion would be that the Wyoming appropriator of reservoir water can secure an interest in the
physical plant of the supplying reservoir only by specific
contract, regardless of the language of the statute.
There are relatively few problems of preferred priority
for the reservoir owner. The reservoir right is generally
equated to the direct flow right in preference by priority in
time. There are some exceptions to this general rule. Originally, the Colorado statute provided:
Persons desirous to construct and maintain reservoirs, for the purpose of storing water, shall have the
right to . . . store away any of the unappropriated
waters of the state not thereafter needed for domestic or irrigationpurposes .... ."
The basic assumption had been that the meaning of the statute
was to make a direct flow right preferable to a storage right.
In 1935, the statute was amended to additionally read:
provided, that after April 18, 1935, the appropriation of any water for any reservoir hereafter constructed, when decreed, shall be superior to an
appropriation of water for direct application claiming a date of priority subsequent in time to that of
such reservoir."'
47. CoLo. LAws § 1682 (1921) [Emphasis supplied].

48. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/6

12

McCauley: The Nature of a Reservoir Right

1968

COMMENT

455

Seemingly, it would be apparent that the legislature believed
that, prior to April 18, 1935, all reservoir rights were inferior
to subsequent as well as prior direct flow rights for domestic
and irrigation purposes.4 9 Yet, the Colorado court held, in
1936,5" without reference to the amendment to the statute,
that a reservoir right acquired prior to 1935 was equal in all
respects to a direct flow right, with regard to preference by
priority, and that the direct flow right created subsequently
in time to the reservoir right was always intended to be
subsequent to the reservoir in priority. Although this holding
seems to conflict with a fair reading of the statute, such an
interpretation does mold the law to meet the more flexible
needs of modern technology. There are other states, however,
that still stipulate a preference for one right over the other.
Nebraska provides that during the irrigation season, when
the water is needed for direct application, no reservoir shall
be allowed to impound under its appropriation."1 Texas gives
the application for a reservoir right a preferred position over
a simultaneous application made for a direct flow permit.2
As to forfeiture, the reservoir is treated as a direct flow
right would be treated,5" with the reservation that perhaps
the courts will go to greater lengths to avoid an automatic
forfeiture of a reservoir right. 4 Due diligence may be less
diligence than that required of a direct flow appropriator ;"
a reasonable time may be longer.5"
In Utah, a special procedure is required before a reservoir right will be declared abandoned. 7 The reservoir owner
must be notified of the complaint of non-use, and a hearing
must be held in which the owner is given the opportunity to
explain his intent. The water commissioner must then determine whether the owner has shown cause as to why he should
not be deprived of his appropriation due to non-use.
49. Note, The Storage of Water Needed for Immediate Irrigation,9 ROCKY MT.
L. REV. 91 (1936).
50. People ez. rel. Park Res. Co. v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P.2d 894 (1936).
51. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-241 (2) (1960).
52. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7545 (Supp. 1965).
53. Hallenback v. Granby Ditch & Res. Co., 420 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1966).
54. Laramie Rivers Co. v. La Vassuer, 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680 (1949).
55. Brooks v. Sturgeon, 73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675, 682 (1955).
56. Van Tassell Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333,
54 P.2d 906 (1939).
57. Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Res. Co., 140 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638
(1943).
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PROBLEM AREAS IN THE LAW PERTAINING TO RESERVOIRS

The area of law governing the creation and existence of
the reservoir is in many instances out-dated. The statutes
were written in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.
That portion of the law which was litigated, pertinent to
reservoirs, was interpreted and established as precedent
before many new developments in engineering were conceived.
In some cases the law was given a sufficiently flexible interpretation, allowing technology room for growth. In other
cases, conditions within the state molded the interpretation
of the law, such as the over-appropriation by water users in
Colorado. In the large majority of instances, however, the
law has never been tried in court, and the consequences of
acts by an appropriator for storage are, in these instances,
speculative.
An appropriator by direct flow wishes to convert his
direct flow right to storage. The general rule is to allow
a change in use whenever good reason can be shown to support
the desired change, and there is a showing by the user desiring
the change that no injury to other appropriators will result."
In Colorado, there seem to be some conflicts. The Colorado court has held that it is well recognized that a decreed
water right is a valuable property right subject to sale and
conveyance, and that the change of use may be permitted by
proper court decree, though only in instances where it is
shown that the rights of other users of the water are not
affected injuriously. 9 It would seem, then, that for good
reason an appropriation for a direct flow should be allowed
to be changed in use to a storage right.
In Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co.," in
1915, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Handy Ditch
Co. could not store its direct flow appropriation. The basis
for this decision can be found in the distinction that Colorado
has drawn between the direct flow right and the storage
right.6 ' The two rights were separately ordered and administered by their priorities. The storage right was thus separated
58. See supra note 32.
59. Farmers Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272
P.2d 629 (1954).

60. 86 Colo. 197, 880 P. 481 (1929).
61. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. v. Huppe, 60 Colo. 535, 155 P. 386 (1915).
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from the direct flow because the direct flow was a preferred
right which was entitled to satisfaction before any storage
right could be filled. The court, in this case, felt that to allow
Handy Ditch Co. to store its direct flow appropriation would
be giving the company a reservoir right with the same priority
as the direct flow right, to the injury of reservoir rights
which had been established before the company decided to
store its direct flow appropriation, but whose priority by
date would be later than the direct flow priority of the company's direct flow right. In City & County of Denver v.
Northern Colorado Water Cons. Dist.,6 2 the court applied this
rule of prohibiting the storage of direct flow appropriations
as a basis for denying the city a decree for 1600 c.f.s. of water
from sources on the western slope. The city had attempted
to combine the two means of diversion into one project.
Originally, the city had hoped to divert 1600 c.f.s. from these
sources by direct flow. It was discovered, however that the
city could build a tunnel of half that capacity through the
mountain to the eastern slope, storing the remainder or the
1600 c.f.s. in a reservoir at the head of the tunnel until the
flow of the source decreased sufficiently that the stored water
could drain from the reservoir into the tunnel, thereby giving
the city a more continuous supply, and saving the city
$10,000,000 in expense which would have been needed to
construct a direct tunnel of 1600 c.f.s6
Again, in 1961,64 the court reversed a decree granting a
storage right to an appropriator seeking to store a direct
flow appropriation which he had purchased to supplement
his inadequate supply from his original source. Again, part
of the grounds for the refusal to grant the decree was the
Colorado court's determination that a direct flow right could
not be stored, nor could it be the basis for a storage right.
It is not too difficult to see that this rule developed as
a result of the Colorado appropriator's success in originally
obtaining decrees far in excess of his actual needs, so much
so that at the end of the season the appropriator by direct
flow would have substantial quantities of unused water left
62. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Cons. Dist., 130 Colo.
375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954).
63. Id., 276 P.2d at 1021 (Dissent).
64. Orchard City Irr. Dist. v. Whitten, 146 Colo. 127, 361 P.2d 130 (1961).
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over, which he was usually anxious to sell." Such overappropriation is contrary to the basic principles of maximization for the greatest benefit, and of appropriation for
application to beneficial use. Yet, the continuation of such
an absolute rule as this, today, to the denial of all such
transfers from direct flow to storage without loss of priority
is an impediment to technological progress.
Idaho permits the transfer of a direct flow appropriation
to storage, to no obvious disadvantage. In Big Wood Canal
Co. v. Chapman,6 the canal company had several direct flow
appropriations senior to Chapman's rights, but the company
had canal capacity of only 2500 and 2700 c.f.s., while the
company's appropriations were for 3000, 3000, and 1.4 c.f.s.
The company solved its problem by storing its excess over
the canal capacity until it was able to carry the excess, a
solution very similar to that attempted by the City and
County of Denver in the case mentioned above. The Idaho
court dismissed the complaint as irrelevant as to whether
the permits were in excess of the carrying capacity of the
canals or whether the company stored the direct flow appropriations, or a part thereof, until needed; the criteria by
which the validity of the company's appropriation was
measured was whether the water appropriated was put to
beneficial use. The company was able to show and convince
the court that it had put its whole appropriation to beneficial use. In contrast to the Colorado rule, this rule lends
more flexibility to the law, encouraging development of more
economical and efficient means of reaching the same end.
There remains for discussion the subject of carry-over
or excess storage. Most state statutes permit the storage of
excess water, flood waters, or waste water."' Herein, several
problems arise. Do the statutes intend that the appropriator
shall be allowed to store water in excess of his present (annual) needs to the extent that he will have sufficient water
to carry him through the average cycle of dry years? Should
the appropriator be allowed to store enough water to tide him
through this usual period of dry years and an excess supply
65. MEAD, ImRGAToN INSTITUTIONS 174 (1903).

66. Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 263 P. 45, 53 (1947).
67. Santa Cruz Res. Co. v. Ramirez, 16 Ariz. 64, 141 P. 120 (1914); Federal
Land Bank v, Morris, 112 Mont. 445, 116 P.2d 1007 (1941),
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in addition, as insurance against the infrequent, long dry
spell, such as occurred in the 1930's? Or does the statute
permitting the storage of excess mean to allow the storage
of that amount of water flowing in a stream which will flow
through and out of the state, unused?
Montana views excess as that amount which flows through
the state unappropriated. In Donich v. Johnson,68 the Montana court ruled:
Between irrigating seasons the water of Montana's numerous streams mostly go to waste, and,
generally speaking, in high water time, which usually
is in June, tremendous quantities of flood waters run
away without serving any useful purpose. The construction and maintenance of secure reservoirs for
the conservation of these waters, therefore, is of
very high public importance. 9
Thus, Montana takes the view that excess water is water which
would otherwise "go to waste."
Colorado takes the approach that water may be stored
only to the amount needed :
It is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of
the evidence further than to state that possibly,
excepting a portion of the [water] awarded, it appears that appellee has never applied the water
stored in its reservoir to the irrigation of lands.
Diversion and storage are not sufficient to constitute an appropriation. In addition, the water so
diverted and stored must be beneficially applied;
that is, in this instance, it must have been applied
to lands for the purpose of irrigation.'
Wyoming 2 and Arizona"3 follow Montana's view of excess.
Colorado takes its view, perhaps, in the light of the fact
that most streams in Colorado are already fully appropriated,
to the extent that it may be said, in Colorado, that there is
no excess water which will flow through and from the state,
unused.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
78.

77 Mont. 229, 250 P. 963 (1926).
Id., 250 P. at 966.
Highland Ditch Co. v. Union Res. Co., 53 Colo. 483, 127 P. 1025 (1912).
Id., 127 P. at 1025.
In re Greybull Valley Irr. Dist., 8upra note 14.
Santa Cruz Res. Co. v. Ramirez, supra note 67.
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The reservoir owner may wish to appropriate a large
quantity for storage to meet his annual needs; but, he may
wish to economize by building a reservoir of a capacity equal
to half of his annual need, to be filled twice in one year. If
such be the case, the reservoir owner will be frustrated in
Colorado, and in Montana. He will have difficulties as to
certainty in Wyoming. The question seems never to have
been raised in other jurisdictions.
4
In 1908, in Windsor Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch,"
the Colorado court refused to allow a reservoir owner to fill
his reservoir more than once annually on the same appropriation. An appropriation to impound water was limited
to the capacity of the reservoir. In considering the definition
of capacity, the court discarded the distinction "on the same
appropriation," and finally produced the black letter rule
that a reservoir could be filled only once a year. This rule
has been applied many times since, most recently in 1961, in
Orchard City Irr.Dist. v. Whitten :"'
Plaintiff asserts the right to store the maximum
quantity of water under each of its reservoir decrees. Otherwise stated, it claims the right to store
3,400 acre feet of water under the 1907 decree and
2,870 acre feet under the 1937 decree-a total of
6,270 acre feet to be stored in a reservoir with a
capacity fixed and determined by both decrees to be
3,400 acre feet. Such being the decreed physical
facts, plaintiff's claim amounts to an assertion of
the right to fill the reservoir more than once a year.78
In following the Windsor Canal Co. case, the court held:
While the Windsor case involves the storage of
water from only one source of supply, we nevertheless regard the holding there as decisive of the
right to refill the reservoir whether the sources of
supply be single, dual, or multiple."
And, the result is the deprivation of more efficient use of
the water, due to mechanical application of the law.

In Montana, the supreme court held in Federal Land
Bank v. Morris8 that a reservoir owning two rights under
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Windsor Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98 P. 729 (1908).
Orchard City Irr. Dist. v. Whitten, supra note 64.
Id., 361 P.2d at 135.
Id., 361 P.2d at 137.
112 Mont. 445, 116 P.2d 1007 (1941).
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two separate decrees of different priorities may appropriate
under these rights, but only in the priority given by each
decree. The latest priority must await the satisfaction of
other earlier priorities which are junior rights to the reservoir owner's earlier decree. The fact that the allowance of
such appropriations would mean refilling the reservoir a
second time annually was disregarded, as long as the refill
was a second, separate priority.
Wyoming law is unclear as to this issue. In Van Tassel
Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne,7 9 the Wyoming supreme court ruled:
Limitation to capacity of ditch seems to have
been the general rule, when appropriations commenced for mining purposes.... But, when the principles of appropriation were extended to irrigation,
a different rule grew up, since it was frequently
impracticable for a landowner to construct his diversion works, and therefore make beneficial use of
the water, all at once."0
The court went on to point out that capacity was no longer
the measure of an appropriation, but, rather, the measure
was the amount which could be put to beneficial use. The
court then passed to other considerations, to decide that the
excess water in contention was being put to a beneficial use
by the mere fact that it served as fire protection for the
city."1 Yet there is no discussion here, nor elsewhere in Wyoming case law, of the Wyoming position on the "one fill" rule.
79. Van Tassell Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333,
54 P.2d 906 (1939).
80. Id., 54 P.2d at 913. See also Laramie Rivers Co. v. La Vasseur, 65 Wyo.
414, 202 P.2d 680 (1949). The Wyoming court noted that due to the unevenness of the basin bottom of the reservoir No. 2 of the Wheatland Irrigation
District there was a large body of water of approximately 10,000 acre feet
which was in fact "dead water." This dead water was contained in two
pools which would not drain, despite attempts to cause drainage through
the opening of a trench between the two pools. As a result, the effective
capacity of the reservoir was reduced from 53,000 acre feet to 43,000 acre
feet. However, the court declined to cut the Irrigation District appropriation on the basis of abandonment. The argument of multiple fill was not
used; nor was it mentioned by the court. In effect, however, the court was
allowing an additional fill every year in which the Irrigation District took
its full appropriation. As the reservoir had a capacity of only 43,000,
then every time the water commissioner diverted 63,000 acre feet into the
reservoir in one year he was granting an appropriation in excess of capacity
by 10,000 acre feet. Unfortunately, the court did not, and was not called
upon to, decide the issue on the basis of the Colorado one-fill rule.
81. Van Tassell Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, supra note 79,
at 915.
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In respect to excesses, it is the general rule that a
reservoir owner who stores excess water must, upon demand
by another appropriator with a need, supply the other appropriator with sufficient water from the excess, to the amount
of the excess, to satisfy the other's need. 2 How much of the
reservoir owner's water is excess? How much of the owner's
carry-over supply stored against future dry years is vulnerable to such a request from another appropriator with a
need ? May the reservoir owner refuse to reduce his supply
stored for the unusually long drought? How much of his
insurance must he give up to meet the demands of another
appropriator with a need? To allow every one with a need
to take from the store of excess water would hardly make
the construction of a reservoir worthwhile, as it would be
impossible in many instances to build up a store against the
dry year, next year, much less to build up a store as insurance
to see the owner through the drought cycle of predictable
recurrence and duration. To the other extreme, it would be
contrary to the maximization principle to allow the reservoir
owner to store unreasonable amounts against the longest
drought, which may never occur, while another appropriator
with a present urgent need must do without.
CONCLUSION

In summary, it should be reiterated that the reservoir has
contributed much to the attempt to apply water more efficiently to maximize the benefit obtainable. In most instances,
the law has been molded to facilitate the storage of water
where it is needed. In a few instances, the law should be
modified; measures should be adopted to allow more efficient
development of the concept of storage. The limitation of the
appropriation to a single fill without exception is an example
of law which has inhibited the development of the uses to
which a reservoir could be put. Perhaps as technology advances, the pressures of change will bring about the extermination of the impediments to the maximization of use.
BRIAN T. MCCAULEY

82. Wyo.

STAT.

§ 41-39 (1957); Santa Cruz Res. Co. v. Ramirez, supra note 67;
§ 75-5-16 (1953).

N.M. STAT. ANN.
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